It's All About The (Exceptional) Politics: A Response to Starr, Chapters 2 & 3

Starr’s chapters certainly provide an excellent detailing of early American history as it relates to the media; he positions pre-Revolution America in a developmentally liminal space—no longer British, but also not quite American, either.  But Starr’s American exceptionalist, poli-centric slant weakens the power of the text. As a reader, I always knew what was coming.  Early in chapter two, after citing some American accomplishments in media, he notes that, during the same period, British North America (henceforth Canada), had made little communications progress. Why was America successful when Canada was not? The answer might shock you (sarcasm intended): because of “the political transformation of American society in the previous half-century” (49).

This argument setup takes place in regards to printing, too. Starr again notes America’s uniqueness, telling us, “The independent printer-publisher engaged in the newspaper business was an American phenomenon” (59). To stay true to the facts, he does backup, saying that at first, papers largely focused on foreign, British news, “ritually affirming the colonists’ participation in the imperial system” (61). It was, however, Britain’s published critiques of government control over what should be basic liberties that fueled Americans toward revolution. The press was not just a place for vertical communication—horizontal communication took place through printed debates, debates people could then go and discuss with fellow readers. The media could be a provider of more than just rote information. But the liminality ends here, says Starr, for the British arguments for liberty were used by Americans in a wholly new way—to ignite a revolution. Americans were not satisfied to have demands for their liberties stay on the page—politics motivated them to take action against the British government. American exceptionalism at its finest.  

            Starr’s hard-hitting, predictable approach to bringing everything he talks about back to politics and American exceptionalism has made me reflect on what strategical tactics I use to help make my point in papers. Am I just as nauseating? Is that how one should be, or has to be, even? What does it take to be an effective writer? I realize there are a myriad of ways to answer the latter. I also realize that other readers may not find Starr’s approach nauseating at all—maybe my problem is that I do not fully buy his core argument.

            I was particularly interested in Starr’s discussion of the evolution of free speech. As Starr notes, the first document to be issued in print in the English colonies was the freeman’s oath. He writes that the oath expressed a “political philosophy that was radical for its time” (51). But the Puritan elite certainly did not read the oath as radical in any way. The interpretative controversy regarding the oath immediately brings to mind Stanley Cavell’s question: must we mean what we say? And are we any more bound to mean what we say when words are in print? In this case, the oath said what it meant, but what it meant was determined by what the higher powers wanted it to mean at any given time. Leaders did not let the radical nature of the oath come to life, and when it did, punishment ensued. “Bodily correction” is an intriguing euphemism, and I was equally intrigued by the decision to punish offenses of the cerebral sort through bodily torture. Banishment from the colony, as sometimes happened, makes more sense—if you’re not there, no one can hear what you have to say. (Unless you write down your opinions and send them to your now far-away friends through the postal service. But wait! One would have to be educated. And have assured protection of one’s private letters…) Likewise, when the Virginia General Court bore through Richard Barnes’s tongue with an awl, it made (horribly gruesome) sense. Yet neither of these punishments are silencing the true culprit—the mind. It seems that American leaders subscribed to a physicalist view of the body—the mind is not a separate entity. The crimes, then, are of a bodily (specifically brain) sort, so they should be punished as such. Considering that the notion of Descartian dualism was circulating around at this time, and considering the pervasiveness of religion (where the mind/soul surely does exist) in America, too, I find the evolution of corporeal punishment for intellectual crimes fascinating. Perhaps dualism simply does not lend itself well to the realm of discipline and punishment. (I could easily bring in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish here, but Foucault? He was so last week.)

            Of course, for awhile, freedom of speech in regards to print culture was just as policed as public orations. William Berkeley writes that printing “divulged” incorrect opinions to the masses, thereby putting the media in a position it still holds, in a sense, today: a secret breaker. Even the postal system struggled with secret keeping—were people’s letters going to be opened? Was a letter to be just as public as a newspaper, if the government so chose? Starr particularly notes the Fourth Amendment’s inclusion of “papers”—papers should be secure, people should not have to send encoded letters.  

            The background information Starr provides on education came to life in the articles I found when searching the databases this week, particularly in regards to male versus female learning. One article—admittedly to the shock, the writer supposes, of his readers—recommends spinning as a useful undertaking for women. Another article gives credit to the progress that has been made in regards to female education, but also calls for the forward-moving action America used to propel the Revolution to continue to be applied to female education—women should be given more opportunities, a chance to rise higher in intellectual circles. Settling for the status quo leads only to stagnation, and America is a place of progress. The press really was a place people could freely and now fairly safely go to read or even write their own opinions in regards to education (and anything else).

Starr talks of schools as providers of “useful knowledge.” After his previous dismissal of Habermas, I was not surprised he attacked Marxist theories of the rise of education. I was also not surprised that he ended chapter three with another plug for American exceptionalism and the central role of politics in shaping the advances of communication and literacy. I was surprised—or maybe just sad—that, as part of an overview of education in the South, Starr did not mention UNC-Chapel Hill, the oldest public university in the nation and the only institution of its kind to give out degrees during the 18^th century. Carolina shows the investment people were willing to make not just in “useful knowledge”—how to read, write, do basic math—but in advanced knowledge, the kind of knowledge that can help to empower powerful, continued advancements in the nation. Without advanced knowledge, how would America continue to stand out? After all, it’s not easy being exceptional, Starr.